

October 3, 2013

## **MORGAN STANLEY INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT PROXY VOTING POLICY AND PROCEDURES**

### **I. POLICY STATEMENT**

Morgan Stanley Investment Management's ("MSIM") policy and procedures for voting proxies ("Policy") with respect to securities held in the accounts of clients applies to those MSIM entities that provide discretionary investment management services and for which an MSIM entity has authority to vote proxies. This Policy is reviewed and updated as necessary to address new and evolving proxy voting issues and standards.

The MSIM entities covered by this Policy currently include the following: Morgan Stanley AIP GP LP, Morgan Stanley Investment Management Inc., Morgan Stanley Investment Management Limited, Morgan Stanley Investment Management Company, Morgan Stanley Investment Management (Japan) Co., Limited, Morgan Stanley Investment Management Private Limited and Private Investment Partners Inc. (each an "MSIM Affiliate" and collectively referred to as the "MSIM Affiliates" or as "we" below).

Each MSIM Affiliate will use its best efforts to vote proxies as part of its authority to manage, acquire and dispose of account assets. With respect to the MSIM registered management investment companies ("MSIM Funds"), each MSIM Affiliate will vote proxies under this Policy pursuant to authority granted under its applicable investment advisory agreement or, in the absence of such authority, as authorized by the Board of Directors/Trustees of the MSIM Funds. An MSIM Affiliate will not vote proxies unless the investment management or investment advisory agreement explicitly authorizes the MSIM Affiliate to vote proxies.

MSIM Affiliates will vote proxies in a prudent and diligent manner and in the best interests of clients, including beneficiaries of and participants in a client's benefit plan(s) for which the MSIM Affiliates manage assets, consistent with the objective of maximizing long-term investment returns ("Client Proxy Standard"). In addition to voting proxies at portfolio companies, MSIM routinely engages with the management and may also engage with the board, of companies in which we invest on a range of governance issues. Governance is a window into or proxy for management and board quality. MSIM engages with companies where we have larger positions, voting issues are material or where we believe we can make a positive impact on the governance structure. MSIM's engagement process, through private communication with companies, allows us to understand the governance structures at investee companies and better inform our voting decisions. In certain situations, a client or its fiduciary may provide an MSIM Affiliate with a proxy voting policy. In these situations, the MSIM Affiliate will comply with the client's policy.

Proxy Research Services - ISS and Glass Lewis (together with other proxy research providers as we may retain from time to time, the "Research Providers") are independent advisers that specialize in providing a variety of fiduciary-level proxy-related services to institutional investment managers, plan sponsors, custodians, consultants, and other institutional investors. The services provided include in-depth research, global issuer analysis, and voting

recommendations. While we may review and utilize the recommendations of one or more Research Providers in making proxy voting decisions, we are in no way obligated to follow such recommendations. In addition to research, ISS provides vote execution, reporting, and recordkeeping services.

Voting Proxies for Certain Non-U.S. Companies - Voting proxies of companies located in some jurisdictions may involve several problems that can restrict or prevent the ability to vote such proxies or entail significant costs. These problems include, but are not limited to: (i) proxy statements and ballots being written in a language other than English; (ii) untimely and/or inadequate notice of shareholder meetings; (iii) restrictions on the ability of holders outside the issuer's jurisdiction of organization to exercise votes; (iv) requirements to vote proxies in person; (v) the imposition of restrictions on the sale of the securities for a period of time in proximity to the shareholder meeting; and (vi) requirements to provide local agents with power of attorney to facilitate our voting instructions. As a result, we vote clients' non-U.S. proxies on a best efforts basis only, after weighing the costs and benefits of voting such proxies, consistent with the Client Proxy Standard. ISS has been retained to provide assistance in connection with voting non-U.S. proxies.

## **II. GENERAL PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES**

To promote consistency in voting proxies on behalf of its clients, we follow this Policy (subject to any exception set forth herein). The Policy addresses a broad range of issues, and provides general voting parameters on proposals that arise most frequently. However, details of specific proposals vary, and those details affect particular voting decisions, as do factors specific to a given company. Pursuant to the procedures set forth herein, we may vote in a manner that is not in accordance with the following general guidelines, provided the vote is approved by the Proxy Review Committee (see Section III for description) and is consistent with the Client Proxy Standard. Morgan Stanley AIP GP LP will follow the procedures as described in Appendix A.

We endeavor to integrate governance and proxy voting policy with investment goals, using the vote to encourage portfolio companies to enhance long-term shareholder value and to provide a high standard of transparency such that equity markets can value corporate assets appropriately.

We seek to follow the Client Proxy Standard for each client. At times, this may result in split votes, for example when different clients have varying economic interests in the outcome of a particular voting matter (such as a case in which varied ownership interests in two companies involved in a merger result in different stakes in the outcome). We also may split votes at times based on differing views of portfolio managers.

We may abstain on matters for which disclosure is inadequate.

### **A. Routine Matters.**

We generally support routine management proposals. The following are examples of routine management proposals:

- Approval of financial statements and auditor reports if delivered with an unqualified auditor’s opinion.
- General updating/corrective amendments to the charter, articles of association or bylaws, unless we believe that such amendments would diminish shareholder rights.
- Most proposals related to the conduct of the annual meeting, with the following exceptions. We generally oppose proposals that relate to “the transaction of such other business which may come before the meeting,” and open-ended requests for adjournment. However, where management specifically states the reason for requesting an adjournment and the requested adjournment would facilitate passage of a proposal that would otherwise be supported under this Policy (i.e. an uncontested corporate transaction), the adjournment request will be supported.

We generally support shareholder proposals advocating confidential voting procedures and independent tabulation of voting results.

**B. Board of Directors.**

1. Election of directors: Votes on board nominees can involve balancing a variety of considerations. In vote decisions, we may take into consideration whether the company has a majority voting policy in place that we believe makes the director vote more meaningful. In the absence of a proxy contest, we generally support the board’s nominees for director except as follows:
  - a. We consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee if we believe a direct conflict exists between the interests of the nominee and the public shareholders, including failure to meet fiduciary standards of care and/or loyalty. We may oppose directors where we conclude that actions of directors are unlawful, unethical or negligent. We consider opposing individual board members or an entire slate if we believe the board is entrenched and/or dealing inadequately with performance problems; if we believe the board is acting with insufficient independence between the board and management; or if we believe the board has not been sufficiently forthcoming with information on key governance or other material matters.
  - b. We consider withholding support from or voting against interested directors if the company’s board does not meet market standards for director independence, or if otherwise we believe board independence is insufficient. We refer to prevalent market standards as promulgated by a stock exchange or other authority within a given market (e.g., New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq rules for most U.S. companies, and The Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom). Thus, for an NYSE company with no controlling shareholder, we would expect that at a minimum a majority of directors should be independent as defined by NYSE. Where we view market

standards as inadequate, we may withhold votes based on stronger independence standards. Market standards notwithstanding, we generally do not view long board tenure alone as a basis to classify a director as non-independent.

- i. At a company with a shareholder or group that controls the company by virtue of a majority economic interest in the company, we have a reduced expectation for board independence, although we believe the presence of independent directors can be helpful, particularly in staffing the audit committee, and at times we may withhold support from or vote against a nominee on the view the board or its committees are not sufficiently independent. In markets where board independence is not the norm (e.g. Japan), however, we consider factors including whether a board of a controlled company includes independent members who can be expected to look out for interests of minority holders.
  - ii. We consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee if he or she is affiliated with a major shareholder that has representation on a board disproportionate to its economic interest.
- c. Depending on market standards, we consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee who is interested and who is standing for election as a member of the company's compensation/remuneration, nominating/governance or audit committee.
- d. We consider withholding support from or voting against nominees if the term for which they are nominated is excessive. We consider this issue on a market-specific basis.
- e. We consider withholding support from or voting against nominees if in our view there has been insufficient board renewal (turnover), particularly in the context of extended poor company performance.
- f. We consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee standing for election if the board has not taken action to implement generally accepted governance practices for which there is a "bright line" test. For example, in the context of the U.S. market, failure to eliminate a dead hand or slow hand poison pill would be seen as a basis for opposing one or more incumbent nominees.
- g. In markets that encourage designated audit committee financial experts, we consider voting against members of an audit committee if no members are designated as such. We also consider voting against the audit committee members if the company has faced financial reporting issues and/or does not put the auditor up for ratification by shareholders.

- h. We believe investors should have the ability to vote on individual nominees, and may abstain or vote against a slate of nominees where we are not given the opportunity to vote on individual nominees.
  - i. We consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee who has failed to attend at least 75% of the nominee's board and board committee meetings within a given year without a reasonable excuse. We also consider opposing nominees if the company does not meet market standards for disclosure on attendance.
  - j. We consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee who appears overcommitted, particularly through service on an excessive number of boards. Market expectations are incorporated into this analysis; for U.S. boards, we generally oppose election of a nominee who serves on more than six public company boards (excluding investment companies), although we also may reference National Association of Corporate Directors guidance suggesting that public company CEOs, for example, should serve on no more than two outside boards given level of time commitment required in their primary job.
  - k. We consider withholding support from or voting against a nominee where we believe executive remuneration practices are poor, particularly if the company does not offer shareholders a separate "say-on-pay" advisory vote on pay.
2. Discharge of directors' duties: In markets where an annual discharge of directors' responsibility is a routine agenda item, we generally support such discharge. However, we may vote against discharge or abstain from voting where there are serious findings of fraud or other unethical behavior for which the individual bears responsibility. The annual discharge of responsibility represents shareholder approval of disclosed actions taken by the board during the year and may make future shareholder action against the board difficult to pursue.
  3. Board independence: We generally support U.S. shareholder proposals requiring that a certain percentage (up to 66⅔%) of the company's board members be independent directors, and promoting all-independent audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees.
  4. Board diversity: We consider on a case-by-case basis shareholder proposals urging diversity of board membership with respect to gender, race or other factors.
  5. Majority voting: We generally support proposals requesting or requiring majority voting policies in election of directors, so long as there is a carve-out for plurality voting in the case of contested elections.
  6. Proxy access: We consider on a case-by-case basis shareholder proposals on particular procedures for inclusion of shareholder nominees in company proxy statements.

7. Reimbursement for dissident nominees: We generally support well-crafted U.S. shareholder proposals that would provide for reimbursement of dissident nominees elected to a board, as the cost to shareholders in electing such nominees can be factored into the voting decision on those nominees.
8. Proposals to elect directors more frequently: In the U.S. public company context, we usually support shareholder and management proposals to elect all directors annually (to “declassify” the board), although we make an exception to this policy where we believe that long-term shareholder value may be harmed by this change given particular circumstances at the company at the time of the vote on such proposal. As indicated above, outside the United States we generally support greater accountability to shareholders that comes through more frequent director elections, but recognize that many markets embrace longer term lengths, sometimes for valid reasons given other aspects of the legal context in electing boards.
9. Cumulative voting: We generally support proposals to eliminate cumulative voting in the U.S. market context. (Cumulative voting provides that shareholders may concentrate their votes for one or a handful of candidates, a system that can enable a minority bloc to place representation on a board.) U.S. proposals to establish cumulative voting in the election of directors generally will not be supported.
10. Separation of Chairman and CEO positions: We vote on shareholder proposals to separate the Chairman and CEO positions and/or to appoint an independent Chairman based in part on prevailing practice in particular markets, since the context for such a practice varies. In many non-U.S. markets, we view separation of the roles as a market standard practice, and support division of the roles in that context. In the United States, we consider such proposals on a case-by-case basis, considering, among other things, the existing board leadership structure, company performance, and any evidence of entrenchment or perceived risk that power is overly concentrated in a single individual.
11. Director retirement age and term limits: Proposals setting or recommending director retirement ages or director term limits are voted on a case-by-case basis that includes consideration of company performance, the rate of board renewal, evidence of effective individual director evaluation processes, and any indications of entrenchment.
12. Proposals to limit directors’ liability and/or broaden indemnification of officers and directors: Generally, we will support such proposals provided that an individual is eligible only if he or she has not acted in bad faith, with gross negligence or with reckless disregard of their duties.

**C. Statutory auditor boards.** The statutory auditor board, which is separate from the main board of directors, plays a role in corporate governance in several markets. These boards are elected by shareholders to provide assurance on compliance with legal and accounting standards and the company’s articles of association. We generally vote for statutory auditor nominees if they meet independence standards. In markets that require disclosure on attendance by internal statutory auditors, however, we consider voting against nominees for these positions

who failed to attend at least 75% of meetings in the previous year. We also consider opposing nominees if the company does not meet market standards for disclosure on attendance.

**D. Corporate transactions and proxy fights.** We examine proposals relating to mergers, acquisitions and other special corporate transactions (i.e., takeovers, spin-offs, sales of assets, reorganizations, restructurings and recapitalizations) on a case-by-case basis in the interests of each fund or other account. Proposals for mergers or other significant transactions that are friendly and approved by the Research Providers usually are supported if there is no portfolio manager objection. We also analyze proxy contests on a case-by-case basis.

**E. Changes in capital structure.**

1. We generally support the following:

- Management and shareholder proposals aimed at eliminating unequal voting rights, assuming fair economic treatment of classes of shares we hold.
- U.S. management proposals to increase the authorization of existing classes of common stock (or securities convertible into common stock) if: (i) a clear business purpose is stated that we can support and the number of shares requested is reasonable in relation to the purpose for which authorization is requested; and/or (ii) the authorization does not exceed 100% of shares currently authorized and at least 30% of the total new authorization will be outstanding. (We consider proposals that do not meet these criteria on a case-by-case basis.)
- U.S. management proposals to create a new class of preferred stock or for issuances of preferred stock up to 50% of issued capital, unless we have concerns about use of the authority for anti-takeover purposes.
- Proposals in non-U.S. markets that in our view appropriately limit potential dilution of existing shareholders. A major consideration is whether existing shareholders would have preemptive rights for any issuance under a proposal for standing share issuance authority. We generally consider market-specific guidance in making these decisions; for example, in the U.K. market we usually follow Association of British Insurers' ("ABI") guidance, although company-specific factors may be considered and for example, may sometimes lead us to voting against share authorization proposals even if they meet ABI guidance.
- Management proposals to authorize share repurchase plans, except in some cases in which we believe there are insufficient protections against use of an authorization for anti-takeover purposes.
- Management proposals to reduce the number of authorized shares of common or preferred stock, or to eliminate classes of preferred stock.
- Management proposals to effect stock splits.

- Management proposals to effect reverse stock splits if management proportionately reduces the authorized share amount set forth in the corporate charter. Reverse stock splits that do not adjust proportionately to the authorized share amount generally will be approved if the resulting increase in authorized shares coincides with the proxy guidelines set forth above for common stock increases.
  - Management dividend payout proposals, except where we perceive company payouts to shareholders as inadequate.
2. We generally oppose the following (notwithstanding management support):
- Proposals to add classes of stock that would substantially dilute the voting interests of existing shareholders.
  - Proposals to increase the authorized or issued number of shares of existing classes of stock that are unreasonably dilutive, particularly if there are no preemptive rights for existing shareholders. However, depending on market practices, we consider voting for proposals giving general authorization for issuance of shares not subject to pre-emptive rights if the authority is limited.
  - Proposals that authorize share issuance at a discount to market rates, except where authority for such issuance is de minimis, or if there is a special situation that we believe justifies such authorization (as may be the case, for example, at a company under severe stress and risk of bankruptcy).
  - Proposals relating to changes in capitalization by 100% or more.

We consider on a case-by-case basis shareholder proposals to increase dividend payout ratios, in light of market practice and perceived market weaknesses, as well as individual company payout history and current circumstances. For example, currently we perceive low payouts to shareholders as a concern at some Japanese companies, but may deem a low payout ratio as appropriate for a growth company making good use of its cash, notwithstanding the broader market concern.

**F. Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights.**

1. Shareholder rights plans: We generally support proposals to require shareholder approval or ratification of shareholder rights plans (poison pills). In voting on rights plans or similar takeover defenses, we consider on a case-by-case basis whether the company has demonstrated a need for the defense in the context of promoting long-term share value; whether provisions of the defense are in line with generally accepted governance principles in the market (and specifically the presence of an adequate qualified offer provision that would exempt offers meeting certain conditions from the

pill); and the specific context if the proposal is made in the midst of a takeover bid or contest for control.

2. Supermajority voting requirements: We generally oppose requirements for supermajority votes to amend the charter or bylaws, unless the provisions protect minority shareholders where there is a large shareholder. In line with this view, in the absence of a large shareholder we support reasonable shareholder proposals to limit such supermajority voting requirements.
3. Shareholders right to call a special meeting: We consider proposals to enhance a shareholder's rights to call meetings on a case-by-case basis. At large-cap U.S. companies, we generally support efforts to establish the right of holders of 10% or more of shares to call special meetings, unless the board or state law has set a policy or law establishing such rights at a threshold that we believe to be acceptable.
4. Written consent rights: In the U.S. context, we examine proposals for shareholder written consent rights on a case-by-case basis.
5. Reincorporation: We consider management and shareholder proposals to reincorporate to a different jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. We oppose such proposals if we believe the main purpose is to take advantage of laws or judicial precedents that reduce shareholder rights.
6. Anti-greenmail provisions: Proposals relating to the adoption of anti-greenmail provisions will be supported, provided that the proposal: (i) defines greenmail; (ii) prohibits buyback offers to large block holders (holders of at least 1% of the outstanding shares and in certain cases, a greater amount) not made to all shareholders or not approved by disinterested shareholders; and (iii) contains no anti-takeover measures or other provisions restricting the rights of shareholders.
7. Bundled proposals: We may consider opposing or abstaining on proposals if disparate issues are "bundled" and presented for a single vote.

**G. Auditors.** We generally support management proposals for selection or ratification of independent auditors. However, we may consider opposing such proposals with reference to incumbent audit firms if the company has suffered from serious accounting irregularities and we believe rotation of the audit firm is appropriate, or if fees paid to the auditor for non-audit-related services are excessive. Generally, to determine if non-audit fees are excessive, a 50% test will be applied (i.e., non-audit-related fees should be less than 50% of the total fees paid to the auditor). We generally vote against proposals to indemnify auditors.

#### **H. Executive and Director Remuneration.**

1. We generally support the following:

- Proposals for employee equity compensation plans and other employee ownership plans, provided that our research does not indicate that approval of the plan would be against shareholder interest. Such approval may be against shareholder interest if it authorizes excessive dilution and shareholder cost, particularly in the context of high usage (“run rate”) of equity compensation in the recent past; or if there are objectionable plan design and provisions.
  - Proposals relating to fees to outside directors, provided the amounts are not excessive relative to other companies in the country or industry, and provided that the structure is appropriate within the market context. While stock-based compensation to outside directors is positive if moderate and appropriately structured, we are wary of significant stock option awards or other performance-based awards for outside directors, as well as provisions that could result in significant forfeiture of value on a director’s decision to resign from a board (such forfeiture can undercut director independence).
  - Proposals for employee stock purchase plans that permit discounts, but only for grants that are part of a broad-based employee plan, including all non-executive employees, and only if the discounts are limited to a reasonable market standard or less.
  - Proposals for the establishment of employee retirement and severance plans, provided that our research does not indicate that approval of the plan would be against shareholder interest.
2. We generally oppose retirement plans and bonuses for non-executive directors and independent statutory auditors.
  3. In the U.S. context, we generally vote against shareholder proposals requiring shareholder approval of all severance agreements, but we generally support proposals that require shareholder approval for agreements in excess of three times the annual compensation (salary and bonus). We generally oppose shareholder proposals that would establish arbitrary caps on pay. We consider on a case-by-case basis shareholder proposals that seek to limit Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs), but support such shareholder proposals where we consider SERPs excessive.
  4. Shareholder proposals advocating stronger and/or particular pay-for-performance models will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with consideration of the merits of the individual proposal within the context of the particular company and its labor markets, and the company’s current and past practices. While we generally support emphasis on long-term components of senior executive pay and strong linkage of pay to performance, we consider factors including whether a proposal may be overly prescriptive, and the impact of the proposal, if implemented as written, on recruitment and retention.

5. We generally support proposals advocating reasonable senior executive and director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements for shares gained in executive equity compensation programs.
6. We generally support shareholder proposals for reasonable “claw-back” provisions that provide for company recovery of senior executive bonuses to the extent they were based on achieving financial benchmarks that were not actually met in light of subsequent restatements.
7. Management proposals effectively to re-price stock options are considered on a case-by-case basis. Considerations include the company’s reasons and justifications for a re-pricing, the company’s competitive position, whether senior executives and outside directors are excluded, potential cost to shareholders, whether the re-pricing or share exchange is on a value-for-value basis, and whether vesting requirements are extended.
8. Say-on-Pay: We consider proposals relating to an advisory vote on remuneration on a case-by-case basis. Considerations include a review of the relationship between executive remuneration and performance based on operating trends and total shareholder return over multiple performance periods. In addition, we review remuneration structures and potential poor pay practices, including relative magnitude of pay, discretionary bonus awards, tax gross ups, change-in-control features, internal pay equity and peer group construction. As long-term investors, we support remuneration policies that align with long-term shareholder returns.

**I. Social, Political and Environmental Issues.** Shareholders in the United States and certain other markets submit proposals encouraging changes in company disclosure and practices related to particular corporate social, political and environmental matters. We consider how to vote on the proposals on a case-by-case basis to determine likely impacts on shareholder value. We seek to balance concerns on reputational and other risks that lie behind a proposal against costs of implementation, while considering appropriate shareholder and management prerogatives. We may abstain from voting on proposals that do not have a readily determinable financial impact on shareholder value. We support proposals that if implemented would enhance useful disclosure, but we generally vote against proposals requesting reports that we believe are duplicative, related to matters not material to the business, or that would impose unnecessary or excessive costs. We believe that certain social and environmental shareholder proposals may intrude excessively on management prerogatives, which can lead us to oppose them.

**J. Fund of Funds.** Certain Funds advised by an MSIM Affiliate invest only in other MSIM Funds. If an underlying fund has a shareholder meeting, in order to avoid any potential conflict of interest, such proposals will be voted in the same proportion as the votes of the other shareholders of the underlying fund, unless otherwise determined by the Proxy Review Committee. Other MSIM Funds invest in unaffiliated funds. If an unaffiliated underlying fund has a shareholder meeting and the MSIM Fund owns more than 25% of the voting shares of the

underlying fund, the MSIM Fund will vote its shares in the unaffiliated underlying fund in the same proportion as the votes of the other shareholders of the underlying fund.

### **III. ADMINISTRATION OF POLICY**

The MSIM Proxy Review Committee (the “Committee”) has overall responsibility for the Policy. The Committee, which is appointed by MSIM’s Long-Only Executive Committee, consists of investment professionals who represent the different investment disciplines and geographic locations of the firm, and is chaired by the director of the Corporate Governance Team (“CGT”). Because proxy voting is an investment responsibility and impacts shareholder value, and because of their knowledge of companies and markets, portfolio managers and other members of investment staff play a key role in proxy voting, although the Committee has final authority over proxy votes.

The CGT Director is responsible for identifying issues that require Committee deliberation or ratification. The CGT, working with advice of investment teams and the Committee, is responsible for voting on routine items and on matters that can be addressed in line with these Policy guidelines. The CGT has responsibility for voting case-by-case where guidelines and precedent provide adequate guidance.

The Committee will periodically review and have the authority to amend, as necessary, the Policy and establish and direct voting positions consistent with the Client Proxy Standard.

CGT and members of the Committee may take into account Research Providers’ recommendations and research as well as any other relevant information they may request or receive, including portfolio manager and/or analyst comments and research, as applicable. Generally, proxies related to securities held in accounts that are managed pursuant to quantitative, index or index-like strategies (“Index Strategies”) will be voted in the same manner as those held in actively managed accounts, unless economic interests of the accounts differ. Because accounts managed using Index Strategies are passively managed accounts, research from portfolio managers and/or analysts related to securities held in these accounts may not be available. If the affected securities are held only in accounts that are managed pursuant to Index Strategies, and the proxy relates to a matter that is not described in this Policy, the CGT will consider all available information from the Research Providers, and to the extent that the holdings are significant, from the portfolio managers and/or analysts.

#### **A. Committee Procedures**

The Committee meets at least quarterly, and reviews and considers changes to the Policy at least annually. Through meetings and/or written communications, the Committee is responsible for monitoring and ratifying “split votes” (i.e., allowing certain shares of the same issuer that are the subject of the same proxy solicitation and held by one or more MSIM portfolios to be voted differently than other shares) and/or “override voting” (i.e., voting all MSIM portfolio shares in a manner contrary to the Policy). The Committee will review developing issues and approve upcoming votes, as appropriate, for matters as requested by CGT.

The Committee reserves the right to review voting decisions at any time and to make voting decisions as necessary to ensure the independence and integrity of the votes.

## **B. Material Conflicts of Interest**

In addition to the procedures discussed above, if the CGT Director determines that an issue raises a material conflict of interest, the CGT Director may request a special committee to review, and recommend a course of action with respect to, the conflict(s) in question (“Special Committee”).

A potential material conflict of interest could exist in the following situations, among others:

1. The issuer soliciting the vote is a client of MSIM or an affiliate of MSIM and the vote is on a matter that materially affects the issuer.
2. The proxy relates to Morgan Stanley common stock or any other security issued by Morgan Stanley or its affiliates except if echo voting is used, as with MSIM Funds, as described herein.
3. Morgan Stanley has a material pecuniary interest in the matter submitted for a vote (e.g., acting as a financial advisor to a party to a merger or acquisition for which Morgan Stanley will be paid a success fee if completed).

If the CGT Director determines that an issue raises a potential material conflict of interest, depending on the facts and circumstances, the issue will be addressed as follows:

1. If the matter relates to a topic that is discussed in this Policy, the proposal will be voted as per the Policy.
2. If the matter is not discussed in this Policy or the Policy indicates that the issue is to be decided case-by-case, the proposal will be voted in a manner consistent with the Research Providers, provided that all the Research Providers consulted have the same recommendation, no portfolio manager objects to that vote, and the vote is consistent with MSIM’s Client Proxy Standard.
3. If the Research Providers’ recommendations differ, the CGT Director will refer the matter to a Special Committee to vote on the proposal, as appropriate.

Any Special Committee shall be comprised of the CGT Director, and at least two portfolio managers (preferably members of the Committee), as approved by the Committee. The CGT Director may request non-voting participation by MSIM’s General Counsel or his/her designee and the Chief Compliance Officer or his/her designee. In addition to the research provided by Research Providers, the Special Committee may request analysis from MSIM Affiliate investment professionals and outside sources to the extent it deems appropriate.

### **C. Proxy Voting Reporting**

The CGT will document in writing all Committee and Special Committee decisions and actions, which documentation will be maintained by the CGT for a period of at least six years. To the extent these decisions relate to a security held by an MSIM Fund, the CGT will report the decisions to each applicable Board of Trustees/Directors of those Funds at each Board's next regularly scheduled Board meeting. The report will contain information concerning decisions made during the most recently ended calendar quarter immediately preceding the Board meeting.

MSIM will promptly provide a copy of this Policy to any client requesting it. MSIM will also, upon client request, promptly provide a report indicating how each proxy was voted with respect to securities held in that client's account.

MSIM's Legal Department is responsible for filing an annual Form N-PX on behalf of each MSIM Fund for which such filing is required, indicating how all proxies were voted with respect to such Fund's holdings.

## APPENDIX A

Appendix A applies to the following accounts managed by Morgan Stanley AIP GP LP or Private Investment Partners Inc. ("AIP"): (i) closed-end funds registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, (ii) separate accounts and (iii) unregistered funds.

Generally, AIP will follow the guidelines set forth in Section II of MSIM's Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures. To the extent that such guidelines do not provide specific direction, or AIP determines that consistent with the Client Proxy Standard, the guidelines should not be followed, the Proxy Review Committee has delegated the voting authority to vote securities held by accounts managed by AIP to the Fund of Hedge Funds investment team, the Private Equity Fund of Funds investment team or the Private Equity Real Estate Fund of Funds investment team of AIP. A summary of decisions made by the investment teams will be made available to the Proxy Review Committee for its information at the next scheduled meeting of the Proxy Review Committee.

In certain cases, AIP may determine to abstain from determining (or recommending) how a proxy should be voted (and therefore abstain from voting such proxy or recommending how such proxy should be voted), such as where the expected cost of giving due consideration to the proxy does not justify the potential benefits to the affected account(s) that might result from adopting or rejecting (as the case may be) the measure in question.

### Waiver of Voting Rights

For regulatory reasons, AIP may either 1) invest in a class of securities of an underlying fund (the "Fund") that does not provide for voting rights; or 2) waive 100% of its voting rights with respect to the following:

1. Any rights with respect to the removal or replacement of a director, general partner, managing member or other person acting in a similar capacity for or on behalf of the Fund (each individually a "Designated Person," and collectively, the "Designated Persons"), which may include, but are not limited to, voting on the election or removal of a Designated Person in the event of such Designated Person's death, disability, insolvency, bankruptcy, incapacity, or other event requiring a vote of interest holders of the Fund to remove or replace a Designated Person; and
2. Any rights in connection with a determination to renew, dissolve, liquidate, or otherwise terminate or continue the Fund, which may include, but are not limited to, voting on the renewal, dissolution, liquidation, termination or continuance of the Fund upon the occurrence of an event described in the Fund's organizational documents; provided, however, that, if the Fund's organizational documents require the consent of the Fund's general partner or manager, as the case may be, for any such termination or continuation of the Fund to be effective, then AIP may exercise its voting rights with respect to such matter.